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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
years, by which many matters, formerly considered pro-
cedural and within the exclusive province of state regula-
tion, are now considered federal constitutional matters. 3
Were the Maryland Court of Appeals to revise its rul-
ings and make greater use of post-conviction remedies by
allowing the hearing of any allegation which arguably
raises federal constitutional grounds, it would not only
better perform its federal constitutional duty by providing
a fair hearing of federal constitutional allegations, but also
fairly encourage the finality of litigation and strike a more
appropriate balance within the framework of federalism.
Interpretation Of Indemnity Clauses
In Construction Contracts
Macon v. Warren Petroleum Corp.'
Plaintiffs were employees of an independent contractor
who, pursuant to a construction contract containing an in-
demnity clause, had agreed to perform work at defendant-
property owner's premises. They were injured while at
work, solely as the result of defendant's negligence, and
sued to recover. The defendant claimed that, as indemni-
tee under the indemnity clause in the contract, he was
entitled to indemnification from the contractor-indemnitor.
He relied on the following clauses of the indemnity
agreement:
"'Contractor indemnifies and agrees to hold Owner
harmless from any and all liability ... resulting from
injuries to or death of persons, including Contractor
and Contractor's employees . . . while Contractor is
performing the work, which arise out of or in connec-
tion with the activities of Contractor, Contractor's ser-
vants, agents and employees * *
' "Through the long series of cases that began with Moore v. Dempsey
[261 U.S. 86 (1923)], the Supreme Court has steadily expanded the uses
of the freedom writ [habeas corpus]. No one can now predict with cer-
tainty what are the outer reaches of the concept of custody 'in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.' [28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c) (3)]." Reitz, supra, n. 67, 1354-55.
1202 F. Supp. 194 (W.D. Tex. 1962), aff'd, 316 F. 2d 287 (1963).
2 Id., 195.
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The district court held that the agreement required the
contractor to assume defendant's liability to the plaintiffs,
even in the absence of terms expressly requiring indemni-
fication for the defendant's negligence. The court ruled
that "it is not necessary for the parties to say in so many
words that they intend to protect the indemnitee against
liability for negligence, it being sufficient if it clearly ap-
pears from the agreement that such was the intention of
the parties."3  Although the court recognized that the
proper rule for construing such agreements is to give effect
to the intent of the parties, it added:
"'In determining the rights and liabilities of the par-
ties . . . their intention will first be ascertained by
rules of construction applicable to contracts generally.
At this point neither party is favored over the other
simply because their agreement is one of indemnity.
After the intention of the parties has been determined,
however, the doctrine of strictissimi juris applies and
the liability of the indemnitor under his contract as
thus interpreted will not be extended beyond the terms
of the agreement.' ,4
And although in some cases an examination of the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the contract may be
necessary to determine such intent, the court concluded
that in this case it was "unnecessary to look beyond the
express terms of the contract" to find such intent, with the
result that the comment about strict construction was
wholly gratuitous.
The courts generally are troubled by how to effect the
parties' intent where indemnity agreements fail to refer
I Id., 196. The District Court cited as support the case of Mitchell's Inc.
v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424, 303 -S.W. 2d 775, 779 (1957). The Court of
Appeals cited for further support the statements of the Supreme Court
of Texas in two cases decided after the Macon case: "The rule is that
when the wording of the contract is sufficiently broad to cover the negli-
gence of the indemnitee and the situation of the parties with reference to
the subject matter of the contract is such that it can clearly be said that
the parties intended that the negligence of the indemnitee should be
covered by the indemnity agreement, then liability thereunder will be
sustained whenever the injury asserted as a basis for indemnity is one
which arose out of the operations embraced by the contract. (Emphsis
supplied.)" Spence & Howe Construction Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 365 S.W.
2d 631 (Tex. 1963) ; "The 'express negligence' doctrine has, in effect, been
rejected in this state not only in instances involving the rental or leasing
of property, but also in cases where an owner-contractor relationship
exists. * * * In owner-contractor situations judicial construction of in-
demnity clauses to cover the indemnitee's negligence notwithstanding
absence of an express provision to that effect in the contract has been said
to be common." Ohio Oil Co. v. Smith, 365 S.W. 2d 621 (Tex. 1963).
'Macon v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 202 F. Supp. 194, 196-197 (W.D. Tex.
1963), aff'd, 316 F. 2d 287 (1963).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
expressly to the indemnitee's negligence.' They have pur-
ported to look beyond the express terms by considering
the language used, the circumstances under which the con-
tract was made and the objects sought to be attained by
the contract.0 What is certain is that there is no rule of
interpretation which can be and is consistently applied;
results often depend on whether the terms of the contract
are strictly or liberally construed.7
In the name of "strict construction", provisions have
frequently been construed against the indemnitee. s The
meaning of "strict construction", however, is not altogether
clear. It has been suggested that:
"It is somewhat misleading to say that an indemnity
agreement must be strictly construed in favor of the
See Potamkin and Plotka, Indemnification Against Tort Liability -
The "Hold Harmless" Clause - Its Interpretation and Effect Upon Insur-
ance, 92 U. Pa. L. Rev. 347 (1944).
6 See Stern v. Larocca, 49 N.J. Super. 496, 140 A. 2d 403 (1958) and cases
cited therein; but see Westinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle
Monroe Bldg. Corp., 395 Ill. 429, 70 N.E. 2d 604 (1946) ; Perry v. Payne,
217 Pa. 252, 66 A. 553 (1907). See also, Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 29; see 12
M.L.E. Indemnity § 3, at 161-162 (1961).
See 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1472, at 598 (1962).
8 See Stern v. Larocca, 49 N.J. Super. 496, 140 A. 2d 403, 406 (1958).
"There will frequently be found in the cases the statement that an
indemnification clause will not cover the indemnitee in respect to a
claim against it arising out of its own negligence unless the contract
contains a clear and unequivocal expression of such intent... .How-
ever, a critical evaluation of the cases in the widely variegated types
of transactions and indemnity clauses involved will show that the
rule referred to is not generally applied to necessarily frustrate cover-
age of the indemnity clause as against losses partially attributable to
negligence of the indemnitee, if the language of the agreement and the
surrounding circumstances !are indicative of that broad a contractual
intent; but that rule is commonly stated in support of conclusions
against coverage in cases where the precise nature of the relationship
between the indemnitee's negligence and the particular loss or claim
is such as to negate any intent that the parties designed to cover it by
their agreement of indemnification." (Emphasis added.)
The court in Stern v. Larocca noted that in cases involving accidents
due solely to indemnitee's negligence, courts are harder pressed to find a
relationship between indemnitee's negligence and terms of the contract in
the absence of an express provision, than they are in concurrent negligence
situations. [E.g., Humble Oil Refining Company v. Wilson, 339 S.W. 2d
954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)]. Moreover, in the concurrent negligence cases
the courts reason that "to preclude recovery in every case where the negli-
gence of the indemnitee contributed at all to the loss would leave prac-
tically no occasion where the indemnity provision would be operative."
Id., 408. Since the all-inclusive clause may still be applicable to con-
current negligence situations the courts do not feel that the provision is
entirely nullified if they "read into" the agreement a provision excluding
indemnitee's sole negligence on the theory that the parties intended such
a provision but neglected to spell it out. See Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 238 Wis. 124, 297 N.W. 436, 439 (1941) ; Sinclair
Prairie Oil Co. v. Thornley, 127 F. 2d 128, 133 (10th Cir. 1942). "We can
read nothing into the contract that would require [contractor] . . . to
indemnify [owner] . . . against liability from its own negligence [of
owner] ..."; Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 32 (1948).
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indemnitor and against the indemnitee. Although the
distinction has not been frequently noted, the doc-
trine of strictissimi juris is not a rule of construction
but is a principle of substantive law which is appli-
cable after the intention of the parties has been ascer-
tained by ordinary rules of construction."'
Nevertheless, the doctrine of strictissimi juris generally
has been applied as a rule of construction, with the result
that some courts have persisted in strictly construing pro-
visions against the indemnitee, and have thereby perpetu-
ated the idea that indemnity clauses "are not favorites of
the law".'" To this end, the doctrine has been supported
by the propositions, (1) that where "'its [the provision's]
meaning is ambiguous or reasonably susceptible of two in-
terpretations, it must be construed most strongly against
the party who drew it' "; and (2) that the indemnity pro-
visions are presumed to have been inserted at the request
of the indemnitee, who was found in some cases to have
enjoyed a superior bargaining position.12 As a practical
matter,
"The so-called rule of 'strict construction' of indemni-
fication clauses has been justified because of fear en-
sMitchell's Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424, 303 S.W. 2d 775, 777 (1957).
See Stern v. Larocca, 49 N.J. Super. 496, 140 A. 2d 403 (1958); Metro-
politan Pay. Co. v. Gordon Herkenhoff & Assoc., 66 N.M. 41, 341 P. 2d
460 (1959).
-"Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F. 2d 890 (10th Cir. 1960) ; cf. Kansas City
Power & Light Co. v. Federal Constr. Corp., 351 S.W. 2d 741, 745 (Mo.
1961).
"'Contracts of indemnity . . . are usually intended to provide against
loss or liability of one party, through the operations of the other, or
caused by physical conditions that are under the control of the other -
over which the party indemnified has no control, and the party in-
demnifying has control. Indeed, it would take clear language to show
that a contract of indemnity was intended to cover conditions or
operations under the control of the party indemnified, and not under
the control of the indemnifying party, such, for instance, as acci-
dents, the proximate cause of which is the negligence of the party
indemnified.'"
Rome Builders Supply, Inc. v. Kraft Company, 104 Ga. App. 488, 122
S.E. 2d 133 (1961).
"A provision in a contract by which the plaintiff in this case agreed
,that 'in all of its operations hereunder' it would hold the defendant
'free from any claim and/or liability of any kind or character in con-
nection therewith' is a waiver by the plaintiff of its right to sue the
defendant for the defendant's negligence in eonnection with any of
the operations of the plaintiff under the contract, but does not extend
to negligence of the defendant not connected with an operation of
the plaintiff."
See also Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Devlin, 211 Md. 404, 421, 127 A. 2d 640
(1956).
"Pittsburgh S. Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Inc., 404 Pa. 53, 171
A. 2d 185, 189 (1961).
12 See Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F. 2d 890 (10th Cir. 1960).
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tertained that to include the indemnitee's sole negli-
gence within the indemnification coverage would im-
pose upon the indemnitor a liability the extent of
which would be uncertain and indefinite and entirely
in the hands of the indemnitee - a liability which
could not only wipe out all profit but might exceed
the total consideration for the job or even the indemni-
tor's entire fortune. '13
In attempting to come to grips with the fundamental
problems of interpretation and construction, the basic rule
is that "contracts will not be construed to indemnify a per-
son against his own negligence unless such intention is
expressed in unequivocal terms."' 4 At one extreme, "un-
equivocal terms" is defined to require that the parties must
expressly stipulate that the indemnitee is to be indemnified
against his own negligence. 15 Most courts, however, seem
to require something less than express reference to in-
demnitee's negligence. But many of those courts which are
prepared to hold the indemnitor liable for the indemni-
tee's negligence, even without an "express stipulation",
conclude that "broad terms", by themselves, are insuffi-
cient to establish the intent to cover the indemnitee's
negligence. 6 This is particularly true where it is found,
13 Cozzi v. Owens Corning Fiber Glass Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 117, 164 A.
2d 69, 74 (1960) ; of. Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y.
36, 2 N.E. 2d 35 (1936) ; Perry v. Payne, 217 Pa. 252, 66 A. 553 (1907);
Mitchell v. Southern R. Co., 124 Ky. 146, 74 S.W. 216 (1903).
"Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., 356 S.W. 2d 443, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962),
rev'd, 365 S.W. 2d 621 (1963); Accord Pittsburgh S. Co. v. Patterson-
Emerson-Comstock, Inc., 404 Pa. 53, 171 A. 2d 185 (1961); Kansas City
Power & Light Co. v. Federal Constr. Corp., 351 S.W. 2d 741 (Mo. 1961) ;
Metropolitan 'Pay. Co. v. Gordon Herkenhoff & Assoc., 66 N.M. 41, 341 P.
2d 460 (1959). Other courts say that such construction must be required
by "clear and explicit language'. Cozzi v. Owens Corning Fiber Glass
Corp., supra note 13; Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Devlin, 211 Md. 404, 127 A.
2d 640 (1956).
Is See, e.g., Perry v. Payne, 217 Pa. 252, 66 A. 553 (1907). In holding
that an agreement to hold the owner of the premises harmless "from
damages arising from accidents to persons employed in the construction
of, or passing near the said work", did not require the contractor to in-
demnify the owner for his own negligence, the court reasoned that while
the party against whose negligent act the owner would be indemnified was
not designated, the necessity for indemnifying the owner against his own
negligent acts could not have been anticipated by the parties. "[T]here
can be no presumption that the indemnitor intended to assume the
responsibility unless the contract puts it beyond doubt by express stipula-
tion. No inference from words of general import can establish it." Id.,
557. (Emphasis added.) See George Sollitt Constr. Co. v. Gateway Erec-
tors Inc., 260 F. 2d 165 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Westinghouse Electric Elevator
Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Bldg. Corp., 395 Ill. 429, 70 N.E. 2d 604 (1946).
"1 See, Batson-Cook Company v. Industrial Steel Erectors, 257 F. 2d 410,
412 (5th Cir. 1958), "while [indemnity] . . . need not be done in any
particular language or form, unless the intention is unequivocally ex-
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as a matter of fact, that the causal relationship between
the indemnitor's performance of duties under the contract
and the injury is markedly remote and uncertain.17
Furthermore, the very problems of fact finding encourage
the courts to decide on the basis that failure to refer to
the indemnitee's negligence indicates an intent not to pro-
tect the indemnitee against liability for his own negli-
gence;" thus the distinction between the rule which re-
quires that the indemnitee's negligence be referred to ex-
pressly, and that which purports not to require such ex-
press reference is all but eliminated by many courts hold-
ing for the indemnitor. Where the courts hold for the in-
demnitee, "unequivocal expression" has been construed to
mean that express reference to the indemnitee's negligence
is not necessary if the intent of the parties is "unequi-
vocally" manifested by the language as construed in light
of the circumstances surrounding the agreement, i.e., the
conditions under which the work is to be performed and
the objects sought to be attained by the performance. 9
pressed in the plainest of words, the law will consider that the parties
did not undertake to indemnify one against the consequences of his own
negligence." Cf. Metropolitan Pav. Co. v. Gordon Herkenhoff & Assoc.,
66 N.M. 41, 341 P. 2d 460 (1959); Stern v. Larocca, 49 N.J. Super. 496,
140 A. 2d 403 (1958).
27See, e.g., Batson-Cook Company v. Industrial Steel Erectors, supra
note 16, 413. An employee of the indemnitor (sub-contractor) was in-
jured when he slipped from a ladder negligently installed by the indemni-
tee's employee. The indemnification clause covered injuries "sustained in
connection with or to have arisen out of or resulting from the performance
of the work by subcontractor." The court held that while the l'anguage was
"well adapted to defining the areas of the application, it is not peculiarly
apt to define causes either in terms of physical or legal responsibility";
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Childs-Bellows, 352 S.W. 2d 806 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961) (subcontract for installation of elevators). Subcontractor's
employee was injured by falling object that fell into the shaft due to
contractor's negligence. The subcontractor had agreed to "indemnify and
save harmless Contractor from and against any and all loss [etc.] . . .
growing out of, or incident to or resulting from the performance, or
failure to perform the Work or the provisions of this Subcontract." The
court held that indemnity only extended to performance by Westinghouse
in installing elevators and that the negligent conduct of the general con-
tractor's employees had no connection with the installation of elevators;
Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Oo., 271 N.Y. 36, 2 N.E. 2d 35
(1936). (Involving facts similar to those in the Childs-Bellows case,
supra.) The mere fact that the employees of the subcontractor were work-
ing under his contract at the time was not enough to make the injury one
growing out of the execution of work. While it could not have occurred
but for the presence of the subcontractor's employees at the given time
and place, the work of the subcontractor was not the eause of the injury.
Is See dissent in Metropolitan Pay. Co. v. Gordon Herkenhtoff & Assoc.,
66 N.M. 41, 341 P. 2d 460 (1959) ; Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 32.
19 See, e.g., Stern v. Larocca, 49 N.J. Super'. 496, 140 A. 2d 403, 409 (1958),
where contractor agreed to convert an old building into a garage. Con-
tractor's employee was stripping the plaster off the partition wall as part
of the work specified, when part of the ceiling collapsed. The court re-
jected the requirement of express reference to indemnitee's negligence. In
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A number of cases which find for the indemnitee rest
on indemnity clauses that are precise enough to amount
to stipulation even though the words "indemnitee's negli-
gence" do not appear.20 Generally, however, the language
is not unequivocal. In such cases, recovery by the in-
demnitee in the absence of express indemnification for his
own negligence has been sustained on the very breadth of
the language, rather than on its precision, e.g.:
"The Contractor hereby expressly binds himself to in-
demnify and save harmless the City and its Engineer
from all suits and actions of every nature and descrip-
tion brought against the City or any person or persons
on account of the construction of this work or by
reason of any act of omission, misfeasance, malfeasance
of the Contractor or his agents, subcontractors or
employees."'"
Under the above indemnification provision it is arguable
that the terms pertaining to the contractor's acts modify
order to ascertain the intent of the parties the court considered that the
building was old, that the agreement provided that the contractors were
to completely familiarize themselves with the building before beginning
work and that, therefore, the defective condition was known to the parties.
Such circumstances justified the court's conclusion that in agreeing to in-
demnification for losses "by or on account of the prosecution of the work
until possession is taken by the owner . . ." the parties must have antici-
pated the risk involved in such remodeling work.
See, e.g., Southern Pay. Co. v. Fellows, 22 Cal. App. 2d 87, 71 P. 2d 75,
77 (1937).
"The indemnity clause in the contract, undertaking, as it does, to
indemnify railroad company from and against 'any and all claims,
loss, damage, injury and liability howsoever the same may be caused,
resulting directly or indirectly from work covered by this agreement,'
is so sweeping and all-embracing in its terms that, although it does
not contain an express stipulation indemnifying appellant against lia-
bility caused by its own negligence, it accomplishes the same purpose."
(Emphasis added by the court.)
See, Cozzi v. Owens Corning Fiber Glass Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 117, 164
A. 2d 69, 70 (1960). Indemnification included all accidents "whether
occasioned by said Contractor or his employees or 'by Owner or his em-
ployees. . . ." The court said, "Surely it is not necessary that parties
incorporate into the language of their agreement all the specific possibili-
ties through which the indemnitee - owner might cause an accident -
by sole negligence, concurrent negligence, active sole negligence, passive
concurrent negligence, etc." Id., 72. The court discussed Stellato v. Flagler
Park Estates, 11 Misc. 2d 413, 172 N.Y.S. 2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd,
6 A.D. 2d 843, 178 N.Y.S. 2d 242 (App. Div. 1958) and George A.
Fuller Co. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 7 A.D. 2d 33, 180 N.Y.S. 2d 589
(App. Div. 1958), where the clauses involved were "arising out of or in
consequence of the performance of this contract * * * due to any negli-
gence of the owner, subcontractor or general contractor * * *." The in-
demnitor claimed that the work must be the proximate cause of injury
but the New York courts said that the injured person only had to be in
the scope of his employment since the clause was one of absolute indemnity.
=Metropolitan v. Gordon Herkenhoff & Assoc., 66 N.M. 41, 341 P. 2d 460,
461-62 (1959) ; see Fosson v. Ashland Oil & Refining Company, 309 S.W.
2d 176, 177 (Ky. 1957).
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the general scope of liability in the preceding phrase. But
the court in Metropolitan Paving Co. v. Gordon Herken-
hoff & Assoc.2 construed the foregoing clause to impose
liability upon the indemnitor for an injury occurring "on
account of the construction of this work", regardless of
fault. While the disjunctive construction may be gram-
matically sound, it does not obviate the patent ambiguity
in the provision,23 that is, an ambiguity based on disjunc-
tive wording.
In Macon, the indemnity provision was similarly held
applicable to any injury occurring "in connection" with
the contractor's activities2 4 - the connection between the
contractor's activities and the injury being established by
the fact that but for the contractor's agreement to perform
certain carpentry work at the defendant's plant laboratory,
his employees would not have been present when the de-
fendant negligently permitted a poisonous gas to escape
into the room where they were working. Further, in Macon,
it was not apparent from the language of the indemnity
clause itself that the parties contemplated limiting the terms
with reference to negligent acts of either party. However,
it is the breadth of language in Macon which points out the
ambiguity and which, at the same time, admits of two con-
flicting but equally valid implications:
1) if the parties did actually intend to provide cover-
age for indemnitee's negligence they would have
expressed this intention in specific language; and
2) "if the parties had intended some limitation of the
all-embracing language, they would have expressed
such limitation."25
In adopting the latter view, the court in the instant case
supports its position on the grounds that:
Metropolitan v. Gordon Herkenhoff & Assoc., supra note 21, 463.
See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Childs-Bellows, 352 S.W. 2d 806(Tex. Civ. App. 1961), where denial of recovery by the indemnitee under
a similarly phrased provision is based on a conjunctive construction. See
also Compania Anonima Venezolana v. Cottman Company, 145 F. Supp.
.761, 763 (D. Md. 1956), where the court discusses the effect of grammatical
structure of a given clause.
2Macon v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 202 F. Supp. 194 (W.D. Tex.
1962), aff'd, 316 F. 2d 287 (1963). See Princemont Const. Corp. v. Balti-
more & Ohio R. Co., 131 A. 2d 877 (D.C. 1957). ("To assume all liability
for any and all loss and damage to property and claims for injury to or
death of persons in connection with or growing out of the use of said
premises.") ; Russell v. Shell Oil Co., 339 Ill. App. 168, 89 N.E. 2d 415(1949). (" 'Oontractor shall hold Shell harmless from any and all claims
for injury .. . resulting from or arising in connection with any of Con-
tractor's operations'....").
2Princemont Const. Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., supra note 24, 878.
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"To require that there be a causal connection between
their 'activities' and the thing that produced the in-
juries, would be to place a highly restricted meaning
upon that term ["in connection with"] and to read
into the agreement words that simply are not there.
It is unnecessary to look beyond the express terms of
the contract itself to see that the parties intended that
[the owner] should be indemnified by [the contractor]
for any loss sustained as a result of injuries to [the
contractor's] employees, even though they resulted
from [the owner's] own negligence. Whether or not
the agreement was a wise one from the standpoint of
[the contractor], is not a subject of inquiry by this
Court.2 6
If the agreement is clearly unwise, how can the court
in good conscience conclude that, in agreeing to indemnify
the defendant for injuries "in connection with" his activi-
ties, the contractor intended to assume liability for an in-
jury for which he is in no way responsible?
To say that the words "in connection with" do not re-
quire a causal connection between the injury and the in-
demnitor's conduct would seem to be reasonable only where
the indemnitor has control of the premises or instrumen-
tality, the defective condition of which (due to the in-
demnitee's negligence) is the cause of the injury. For this
reason it has been suggested by an intermediary state court
in Texas that a uniform rule should not be applied to all
indemnity relationships. 7 Where under the principal
agreement the contractor is in sole occupancy of the prem-
ises during the time of performance, the courts may be
justified in allowing indemnitee to recover under general
provisions for injury caused by defective conditions, be-
cause the indemnitor-contractor generally agrees to take
equipment or premises "in the condition in which he finds
them".2 But where the owner or his employees are pres-
"Macon v. Warren Petroleum Corp., supra n. 24, 197. (Emphasis added.)
On the rejection of causal connection cf. Russell v. Shell Oil Co., supra
note 24, 417; Smoke v. Turner Const. Co., 54 F. Supp. 369, 372 (D. Del.
1944), and cases cited therein.
Note that where the ambiguity is reeolved in favor of the indemnitor it
is because the court is concerned with the wisdom of the agreement from
the point of view of the party assuming the additional risk of liability.
See cases cited supra note 13.
0,Smith v. Ohio Oil Company, 356 S.W. 2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962),
rev'd, 365 S.W. 2d 621 (1963). Note the rejection of this suggestion by
the Texas Supreme Court in Ohio Oil Co. v. Smith, 365 S.W. 2d 621
(Tex. 1963). See Judge Miller's dissent in Moses-Ecco Company v. Roscoe-
Ajax Corporation, 320 F. 2d 685, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
See, e.g., the facts in Mitchell's Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424, 303
S.W. 2d 775, 778 (1957), illustrating a type of situation in which the in-
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ent on the premises, increasing the hazard and risk in-
herent in the contractor's performance and making it im-
possible for the parties to anticipate and control the sources
of injury, express reference to the indemnitee's negligence
should be required. In Macon, there was no such control
over the premises by the indemnitor as to justify indemni-
fication for injuries caused by independent acts of the
owner. And, indeed, the injury was caused by poisonous
gas escaping from a pipeline in the owner's plant, an in-
strumentality over which contractor neither had nor could
have had any effective control.
But, the court said little more than that in an analogous
case it was said that "if the agreement was held not to
apply to the general contractor's negligence, it meant noth-
ing for the [general contractor] could be held liable only
for negligence. ' 2  The court in using this language appar-
ently relates it to the rule that a property owner is gen-
erally liable for dangerous conditions on his property or
for negligent conduct causing injury to persons on his
property2 Therefore, since the contractor's presence (1)
demnitor's assumption of liability for indemnitee's negligence is clearly
reasonable. In that case a customer of the lessee-indemnitor's assignee was
struck by plaster and lathing which fell from the ceiling. The court held
for the lessor-indemnitee under an agreement indemnifying against lia-
bility "for any damage to person or property . . . due to the building on
said premises or any appurtenances thereof being improperly constructed,
or being or becoming out of repair, nor for any damages for any defects
or want of repair of any part of the building of which the leased premises
form a part, but the Lessee accepts such premises as suitable for the
purposes for which same are leased and accepts the building . . . and
waives defects ... ."; see also Griffiths v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash.
2d 901, 182 P. 2d 18, 175 A.L.R. 1 (1947). See Stern v. Larocca, 49 N.J.
,Super. 496, 140 A. 2d 403 (1958), where the agreement is for the perform-
ance of construction work but the contractor was similarly in complete
control of the premises.
I' Macon v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 202 F. Supp. 194, 197 (1962). Cf.
Moses-Ecco Company v. Roscoe-Ajax Corporation, supra note 27, 688.
1 f. Moses-Ecco Company v. Roscoe-Ajax Corporation, id., 690, dissenting
opinion. See also cases involving railroad spur track leases where in-
demnitor-lessee has been held liable for railroad-lessor's negligent acts,
completely removed from the lessee's control on the theory that if general
terms were not construed to cover the railroad's negligence they would be
meaningless since the railroad would dcrive little benefit from the agree-
ment (the rent being a relatively insignificant part of the railroad's
business income while the lessee has the advantage of a private siding
from which to load and unldad its materials) while the lessee's use of the
track increased the possibility of accidents and liability to the railroad,
e.g., Princemont Const. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 131 A. 2d 877(D.C. 1957). Of. District of Columbia v. General Heating Engineer Co.,
168 A. 2d 903, 905 (D.C. 1961), applying the "benefit theory" where the Dis-
trict had granted a permit to excavate to a plumber, and a motorist was
injured due to the District's negligence in failing to repave after the
plumber had notified that the excavation was ready to be repaved. The
court there stated, "The District, primarily responsible to the public
for the safety of the street, was to gain nothing directly from the excava-
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increased the risk of accident incident to the normal plant
operations, and (2) enlarged the class of persons within
the scope of the risk, the owner presumably wanted to
be reimbursed for any loss he might suffer as a property
owner under the given circumstances. But the rationale
grounded on a property owner's usual liability does not
meet the Macon problem. Although the property owner
could have anticipated liability to the contractor's em-
ployees for injuries occasioned by their unfamiliarity with
the normal conditions on the premises, it is improbable that
the owner would expect the contractor to agree to assume
the owner's liability for injuries due to the owner's active
negligence unconnected with the normally existing state
of the premises. In this situation, the mere statement that
the owner can be "held liable only for negligence" seems
to beg the question: did the parties intend to shift the
risk of liability for negligence under these particular
circumstances?
It is not unreasonable to expect an owner to seek to
avoid the increased risk of liability to a contractor's em-
ployee whose duties bring him within the scope of the
owner's plant operations. Since workmen's compensation
laws in the jurisdiction generally "preclude a common law
action by . . .an employee against [the contractor]", an
action against the owner by the employee may have been
one of the contingencies which the parties considered in
their negotiations.31 However, if the agreement is to be a
wise one from the point of view of both parties, "the shift
of liability [should be] a shift in the burden of providing
adequate insurance coverage. '32 But as far as the courts
are concerned, "the mere statement in a contract that a
contractor shall carry workmen's compensation and public
liability insurance for certain activities in connection with
construction cannot be interpreted as a contract to in-
demnify the other party against liability arising out of
these activities. '33
tion, except perhaps a law suit."; for further application of -the "benefit
theory" see 6A CoRBImN, CONMTRACTS § 1472, n. 53 (1962).
8 Stern v. Larocca, 49 N.J. Super. 496, 140 A. 2d 403, 409 (1958). See
also MD. CODE (1957) Art. 101, § 58; 23 M.L.E. Workmen's Compensation
§ 342 et seq. (1961).
2 Cozzi v. Owens Corning Fiber Glass Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 117, 164 A.
2d 69, 75 (1960).
8 Potamkin and Plotka, Indemnification Against Tort Liability, 92 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 347, 361 (1944). But see, Kansas City Power & Light Co. v.
Federal Const. Corp., 351 S.W. 2d 741 (Mo. 1961), where holding for the
indemnitor, the court reinforced its determination that the terms "in con-
nection therewith" were intended to refer only to the contractor's acts by
examining the scope of the liability insurance taken out by the contractor
in contemplation of his possible contractual obligations under the in-
demnity agreement; Metropolitan Pay. Co. v. Gordon Herkenhoff & Assoc.,
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Regardless of the underlying justification for shifting
liability for the indemnitee's negligence to the indemnitor,
the initial problem still remains: did the parties enter into
the agreement aware of the owner's general liability and
with the intent to relieve him thereof? As long as even
some ambiguity is inherent in broadly drafted indemnity
provisions, are not the courts placed in constant danger
of rewriting contracts with a paucity of evidence as to the
parties' intent?
The terms and effect of any insurance plan should,
therefore, be made clear in the indemnity clause. To avoid
misinterpretation under any rule of construction, the agree-
ment should be drafted so as to convince the strictest court
that the parties intended to protect the indemnitee (e.g.,
"indemnitee's negligence" should be expressly included).
And to prevent the courts from extending the indemnitor's
liability, if the indemnitor does not accede to accepting
responsibility for the negligence of the indemnitee, such
negligence should be expressly excluded.34
SHEILA K. SACHS
66 N.M. 41, 341 P. 2d 460 (1959), where holding for the indemnitee the
court did not discuss the effect of the performance bond but quoted pro-
visions of the bond which included terms identical to those in the in-
demnity agreement between the contractor and the city; Fosson v. Ash-
land Oil & Refining Company, 309 S.W. 2d 176, 178 (Ky. 1957), where
holding for the owned the court noted the fact that the contractor carried
the broadest type of insurance but said, "Since we are not basing our
decision on the type of insurance carried by the appellants, it is unneces-
sary to discuss their contention that their insurance contract with their
carrier should not be considered as a part of the record."
Query whether the court in the principal case was influenced by the
fact that insurance carriers' counsel was defending the indemnitor under
a comprehensive liability policy.
Lathrop, Case Study: Drafting Indemnity Clauses -E.periences of the
Southern Pacific Company in Non-Public Carrier Contracts, 12 Hastings
L.J. 158, 167-169 (1960) :
"Since it is desirable to make it clear that the indemnity clause does
include negligence on the part of the indemnitee, and use of the word
'negligence' in the clause may make it objectionable despite its probable
insurability, we presently are using in some such cases the wording
'regardless of any act or omission on the part of Railroad employees.' * * *
The most frequent modification we have encountered relates to negli-
gence, and is required by the refusal of the indemnitor to assume any
responsibility for the sole negligence of the indemnitee. In such a case,
we have found the most acceptable phrasing to be to conclude the in-
demnitee clause with the words 'except when due to the sole negligence of'
the indemnitee. The only reference to negligence being in the exclusion,
the question may be raised whether the parties intended to include any
negligence by the indemnitee, but it would seem clearly indicated that
the parties were contemplating the effects of negligence and intentionally
excluded only sole negligence, thus necessarily retaining coverage for joint
negligence. We know of no judicial interpretation of this precise point,
but feel it should be upheld. At any rate, it has been found acceptable
from the standpoint of negotiations and attorneys on both sides have
agreed in our interpretation."
